



DOUBLEX: Statically Detecting Vulnerable Data Flows in Browser Extensions at Scale

Aurore Fass

CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

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Based on joint work with Dolière Francis Somé, Michael Backes, and Ben Stock at *ACM CCS 2021*

Aurore (/ɔʁɔʁ/)

- Graduated from TELECOM Nancy (2017)
- PhD Student + Postdoc at CISPA (2017–21)
- Visiting Assistant Professor at Stanford (2021–23)
- Tenure-Track Faculty at CISPA (2023–)



Malicious JavaScript

Fass et al.
DIMVA 2018



Fass et al.
ACSAC 2019


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Malicious JavaScript

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
Moog et al.
DSN 2021


Benign JavaScript




Fass et al.
CCS 2021

Vulnerable JavaScript







Research: Web Security, Privacy, Measurements



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Browser Extensions...

are popular to improve user browsing experience



AdBlock — best ad blocker

Offered by: getadblock.com



Adblock Plus - free ad blocker

Offered by: adblockplus.org



Adobe Acrobat

Offered by: Adobe Inc.



Avast Online Security

Offered by: <https://www.avast.com>



Cisco Webex Extension

Offered by: webex.com



Google Translate

Offered by: translate.google.com



Grammarly for Chrome

Offered by: grammarly.com



Honey

Offered by: <https://www.joinhoney.com>



Pinterest Save Button

Offered by: pinterest.com



Skype

Offered by: www.skype.com



uBlock Origin

Offered by: Raymond Hill (gorhill)



LastPass: Free Password Manager

Offered by: LastPass

are popular to improve user browsing experience

BUT



AdBlock — best ad blocker

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Skype

Offered by: www.skype.com



uBlock Origin

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LastPass: Free Password Manager

Offered by: LastPass

are popular to improve user browsing experience

BUT

Extensions have **elevated privileges** compared to web pages,

→ e.g., an ad-blocker needs to modify web page content or intercept network requests

- Can introduce security & privacy threats and put their large user base at risk, e.g., leading to universal cross-site scripting

- Prior work: focus on *malicious* extensions [1–4]

[1] Chen et al., ACM CCS 2018

[2] Jagpal et al., USENIX Security 2015

[3] Kapravelos et al., USENIX Security 2014

[4] Pantelaios et al., ACM CCS 2020

→ Vetting process before an extension is published on the Chrome Web Store

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→ Vetting process before an extension is published on the Chrome Web Store


- Our focus: **vulnerable extensions** (= benign but buggy)
 - Designed by **well-intentioned developers** but contain vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit
 - **Challenging to detect**, due to their inherently benign intent
 - Prior work mostly manual + 95% false positives [5]

DOUBLEX: Statically Detecting Vulnerable Data Flows in Browser Extensions at Scale


Aurore Fass, Dolière Francis Somé, Michael Backes, and Ben Stock

ACM CCS 2021


Exploiting Vulnerable Extensions




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
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
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
Exploiting Vulnerable Extensions




→ **DOUBLEX**: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context




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DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection

Web page / other extension

Content script

Background page

Extension




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DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection


Web page / other extension

Per-component JS code abstraction

Content script



Background page




Extension



- AST
- Control flow
- Data flow
- Pointer analysis

→ **DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context**

DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection



Per-component JS code abstraction


- AST
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Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)

- Message interactions

→ DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context

DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection



Per-component JS code abstraction

- AST
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
Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)

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Suspicious data flow tracking

→ DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context

DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection



Per-component JS code abstraction

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- Control flow
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
Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)

- Message interactions

Suspicious data flow tracking

➔ **DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context**

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Per-component JS code abstraction

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Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)

- Message interactions


Suspicious data flow tracking

- Detects any path between an attacker & sensitive APIs

↓
Data flow report

Per-Component JS Code Abstraction

```
// Content script code  
window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {  
  
    eval(event.data);  
  
})
```




Per-Component JS Code Abstraction

```
// Content script code
```

```
window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
```

```
    eval(event.data);
```

```
});
```




Abstract code representation



AST

Per-Component JS Code Abstraction

```
// Content script code
window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
  eval(event.data);
})
```



Abstract code representation



AST


– variable dependencies



data flow

Per-Component JS Code Abstraction

```
// Content script code
window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
  if (1 === 1) {
    eval(event.data);
  }
})
```



The diagram illustrates the flow of data and control in the provided JavaScript code. A blue arrow labeled 'data' points from the `event.data` property access to the `eval` function call. A green arrow labeled 'True' points from the `if (1 === 1)` condition to the `eval` function call, indicating that the condition is always true.

Abstract code representation



 AST

– conditions




 control flow

– variable dependencies



 data flow

```
// Content script code
window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
  if (1 === 1) {
    window["e" + "val"](event.data);
  }
})
```



Abstract code representation

– conditions

– variable dependencies

– variable values



✓ AST



✓ control flow



✓ data flow




✓ pointer analysis


DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection

Web page / other extension

Content script



Background page



Extension



→ **DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context**

Per-component JS code abstraction

- AST
- **Control flow**
- **Data flow**
- **Pointer analysis**

Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)


- **Message interactions**

Suspicious data flow tracking

- **Detects any path between an attacker & sensitive APIs**

Data flow report

DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection



→ **DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context**

Per-component JS code abstraction

- AST
- Control flow
- Data flow
- Pointer analysis

Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)

- Message interactions


Suspicious data flow tracking

- Detects any path between an attacker & sensitive APIs

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Data flow report

Extension Dependence Graph

```
// Content script code
window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
  if (1 === 1) {
    window["e" + "val"](event.data);
  }
})
```




- external messages
- internal messages

Extension Dependence Graph

```
// Content script code
window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
  if (1 === 1) {
    window["e" + "val"](event.data);
  }
})
```

Diagram annotations:
- A purple devil emoji is placed above the parameter `event`.
- A blue arrow labeled `data` points from `event.data` to the `eval` expression `["e" + "val"]`.
- A red bracket under `["e" + "val"]` is labeled `eval`.
- A green arrow labeled `True` points to the `if (1 === 1)` condition.

- external messages 
- internal messages

Extension Dependence Graph

```
// Content script code  
chrome.runtime.sendMessage({toBP: mess});
```

```
// Background page code  
chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(function(request) {  
  
})
```

- external messages
- internal messages



Extension Dependence Graph

```
// Content script code  
chrome.runtime.sendMessage({toBP: mess});
```

message

```
// Background page code  
chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(function(request) {  
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```

– external messages



– internal messages





Extension Dependence Graph


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// Content script code  
chrome.runtime.sendMessage({toBP: mess});
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message

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})
```

- external messages 
 - internal messages 
- Models message interaction within and outside of an extension

DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection



Per-component JS code abstraction

- AST
- Control flow
- Data flow
- Pointer analysis

Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)

- Message interactions


Suspicious data flow tracking

- Detects any path between an attacker & sensitive APIs

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Data flow report

➔ **DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context**

DOUBLEX: Suspicious Data Flow Detection



Per-component JS code abstraction

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Extension Dependence Graph (EDG)

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Data flow report

→ **DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows from and toward an extension privileged context**

Suspicious Data Flow Tracking

```
1 // Content script code
2 window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
3     if (1 === 1) {
4         window["e" + "val"](event.data);
5     }
6 })
```

Diagram annotations:

- A green arrow labeled "True" points from the condition `(1 === 1)` on line 3 to the `eval` call on line 4.
- A red bracket underlines the expression `"e" + "val"` on line 4, with the label `eval` centered below it.

Suspicious Data Flow Tracking

```
1 // Content script code
2 window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
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```



Suspicious Data Flow Tracking

```
1 // Content script code
2 window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
3     if (1 === 1) {
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5     }
6 })
```

Diagram illustrating suspicious data flow tracking in the provided code snippet:

- The variable `event` is highlighted in yellow and accompanied by a purple devil emoji.
- A blue arrow labeled `data` points from the `event` parameter to the `event.data` property access in the function call.
- A red bracket labeled `eval` spans the string concatenation `"e" + "val"`, indicating a dynamic property access.
- A green arrow labeled `True` points to the `if (1 === 1)` condition, which is always true.

Suspicious Data Flow Tracking

```
1 // Content script code
2 window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
3   if (1 === 1) {
4     window["e" + "val"](event.data);
5   }
6 })
```

The diagram shows the code from the previous block with several annotations: a purple devil emoji is placed above the `event` parameter in line 2; a yellow box labeled `event` highlights the parameter; a blue arrow labeled `data` points from the `event` parameter to the `event.data` property access in line 4; a red bracket labeled `eval` spans the string `"e" + "val"` in line 4; a green arrow labeled `True` points to the `1 === 1` condition in line 3.



Suspicious Data Flow Tracking

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1 // Content script code
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
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```
// Data flow report
{"direct-danger1": "eval",
 "value": "eval(event.data)",
 "line": "4 - 4",
 "dataflow": true,
 "param1": {
   "received": "event",
   "line": "2 - 2"}}}
```


Case Studies of Vulnerable Chrome Extensions

- Arbitrary code execution (*cdi...*, 4k+ users)




Case Studies of Vulnerable Chrome Extensions

- Arbitrary code execution (*cdi...*, 4k+ users)



- Cross-origin requests (*koh...*, 200k+ users)



Large-Scale Analysis of Chrome Extensions

- Analyzed 155k Chrome extensions from 2021 with DOUBLEX
 - 278 suspicious extensions reported (309 suspicious data flows)
 - **Precision: 89%** (manually) verified dangerous data flows (275 / 309)

Attacker capabilities	#Reports	#Verified data flow	#Exploitable
Code Execution	113	102	63
Triggering Downloads	21	21	21
Cross-Origin Requests	95	75	49
Data Exfiltration	80	77	76
Sum	309	275	209

Large-Scale Analysis of Chrome Extensions

- Analyzed 155k Chrome extensions from 2021 with DOUBLEX
 - 278 suspicious extensions reported (309 suspicious data flows)
 - **Precision: 89%** (manually) verified dangerous data flows (275 / 309)
 - **184 confirmed vulnerable extensions**
 - 2.4 - 2.9 million users impacted
 - 36% can be exploited by *any* websites or extensions
- Analyzed known vulnerable extensions with DOUBLEX [5]
 - **Recall: 93%** of known vulnerabilities are detected (151 / 163)

Life Cycle of Vulnerable Chrome Extensions

- Analyzed 165k extensions from 2020 with DOUBLEX
 - 193 vulnerable extensions (184 in 2021)
 - vulnerability disclosure for 35 extensions (48 extensions when including 2021)

Life Cycle of Vulnerable Chrome Extensions

- Analyzed 165k extensions from 2020 with DOUBLEX
 - 193 vulnerable extensions (184 in 2021)
 - vulnerability disclosure for 35 extensions (48 extensions when including 2021)
- Comparison of vulnerable extensions in 2020 vs. 2021
 - not in the Store anymore: 30 / 193
 - vulnerability fixed: 3 / 193
 - turned vulnerable: 5 / 184
 - new vulnerable: 19 / 184
 - **still vulnerable: 160 (87%!)**

Life Cycle of Vulnerable Chrome Extensions

- Analyzed 165k extensions from 2020 with DOUBLEX
 - 193 vulnerable extensions (184 in 2021)
 - vulnerability disclosure for 35 extensions (48 extensions when including 2021)
 - Comparison of vulnerable extensions in 2020 vs. 2021
 - not in the Store anymore: 30 / 193
 - vulnerability fixed: 3 / 193
 - turned vulnerable: 5 / 184
 - new vulnerable: 19 / 184
- **still vulnerable: 160 (87%!) ➤ Need to prevent vulnerable extensions from entering the Store → DOUBLEX**


Takeaway

unintentionally

Extensions are popular... but may introduce security & privacy threats

→ Because highly privileged

→ Due to their communication with websites / other extensions



DOUBLEX: detects suspicious data flows in extensions

- 184 vulnerable extensions (87% already vulnerable the year before)
- Precision: 89%
- Recall: 93%

 Aurore54F/DoubleX

 @AuroreFass

 Fork 9

 Star 47